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Developing an Innovative Pandemic Treaty to Advance Global Health Security
Lawrence O. Gostin, Benjamin Mason Meier & Barbara Stocking

Recognizing marked limitations of global health law in the COVID-19 pandemic,
a rising number of states in the World Health Assembly have proposed the
development of a new pandemic treaty. This prospective treaty has the potential
to clarify state obligations for pandemic preparedness and response and strengthen
World Health Organization authorities to promote global health security. This
column examines the necessary scope and content of a pandemic treaty, analyzing
the policymaking processes and substantive authorities necessary to meet this
historic moment.
Keywords: Global Health Law, Pandemic Treaty, World Health Organization,
COVID-19

The World Health Assembly will be holding an unprecedented second meeting this year, with
only a single item on the agenda for this November 2021 meeting – the development of a new
pandemic treaty. This pandemic treaty provides a path to develop international legal obligations
through the World Health Organization (WHO). Yet despite strong international political support
for such a treaty, there has been little examination of its potential scope, substance, and legal
process.
This column explores the legal content of a prospective pandemic treaty, offering guidance on its
key elements and potential processes. Recognizing stark failures in global governance during the
COVID-19 pandemic, this new treaty is intended to clarify state obligations to prevent, detect,
and respond to pandemic threats and to strengthen WHO powers. The treaty, therefore, must
develop innovative norms, governance, and compliance mechanisms needed to prepare for novel
outbreaks with pandemic potential.
Examining the development of global health law reforms, this column opens by reviewing the
evolution of international legal agreements governing global health security. However, the
COVID-19 pandemic has exposed continuing limitations of international law and weaknesses of
WHO authorities. These limitations provide the impetus for a new international legal agreement
to strengthen pandemic preparedness and response. This column analyzes potential treaty
structures and substantive authorities needed to face future pandemic threats. We end by
reflecting on diplomatic challenges that states must confront in bringing the world together to
develop a bold new treaty to advance global health security.
WHO Legal Authorities to Develop Global Health Law
States have provided WHO with expansive legal authorities to develop global health law.
Pursuant to these powers, the World Health Assembly has codified evolving authorities to
coordinate international action to prevent, detect, and respond to pandemic threats.

WHO Constitution as a Mandate for Global Health Lawmaking
Under the 1946 WHO Constitution, states declared the “highest attainable standard of health” to
be a fundamental human right, providing WHO with authority to develop international law on
any public health matter through the adoption of:
•
•
•

conventions (article 19) – treaties and agreements that set standards to promote public
health,
regulations (article 21) – legally-binding standards that designate specific actions that
must be taken by member states, and
recommendations (article 23) – non-binding guidelines that provide member states with
guidance on how to promote public health.1

Although WHO was created as a normative agency, with a constitutional mandate to develop
global health law, the organization has long been reluctant to exercise its legal authority under
article 19 to develop conventions, looking instead to article 21 in advancing the International
Health Regulations (IHR).2
International Law to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Pandemics
The IHR stand as the leading legal agreement to respond to the globalized threat of infectious
diseases. Originating out of the international sanitary agreements that predated WHO, the World
Health Assembly has revised the IHR several times to respond to changing health threats across
national borders.3 The current IHR, revised comprehensively in 2005 following the SARS-1
epidemic, has broad participation from WHO member states, with 196 states parties adopting the
regulations to guide efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to a disease outbreak. In balancing
measures to facilitate global health security while maintaining international travel, trade and
human rights, the IHR empower WHO and member states in detecting and responding to public
health emergencies of international concern.4
Beyond the IHR’s binding norms, states have negotiated non-binding “soft law” frameworks to
advance health security. The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, while limited
to pandemic influenza strains, brings together WHO, member states, and non-state actors (e.g.,
pharmaceutical companies and academic laboratories) to help ensure international sharing of
novel influenza pathogens, facilitating equitable distribution of the benefits of influenza research
in developing vaccines and therapeutics.5 Outside WHO, states and international organizations
have come together to establish the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to enhance country
capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases, emphasizing global health
security as a national priority and targeting multisectoral gaps in national policy.6
Limitations of Global Health Law in the COVID-19 Response
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed deep flaws in pandemic preparedness and response, as
the IHR have faced limitations in shaping national responses and political controversies have
weakened WHO governance and institutional capacities.
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IHR Limitations
The international response to the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic has exposed severe limitations
in IHR obligations (and state compliance) to shape an effective coordinated response to global
public health emergencies. Despite major IHR reforms in 2005, the national and global response
to COVID-19 has seen:
Failures to notify WHO promptly of novel outbreaks. The IHR require states parties to
report to WHO “timely, accurate and sufficiently detailed public health information.” China
appeared to violate this norm by failing to promptly report a novel coronavirus circulating in
Wuhan. WHO discovered the outbreak from “unofficial” sources, and even then, China
downplayed the extent of community transmission. Since that time, China has not fully
cooperated with WHO in impartially investigating the origins of SARS-CoV-2. The inability of
WHO to investigate events independently created delays in detection of, and response to, a novel
coronavirus outbreak.
Delays in declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). This
inadequate reporting—compounded by a split in expert opinion, misapplication of the legal
definition of a PHEIC, and WHO’s diplomatic hesitation—prevented a timely WHO PHEIC
declaration, by which point a pandemic was already well underway. While the WHO Director
General did promptly declare a PHEIC on January 30, 2020, there were confused signals five
weeks later when the Director-General declared a “pandemic,” as WHO has no formal legal
power to declare pandemics under the IHR.
Non-compliance with WHO recommendations on outbreak response. It is important to
effectively manage an outbreak response at the global level as it spreads internationally. Yet,
WHO was unable to influence state measures to contain the pandemic through evidence-based
interventions. WHO’s public health guidance and temporary recommendations were repeatedly
ignored by member states, with WHO lacking compliance mechanisms to monitor, investigate,
and remediate harmful actions.
State health measures disproportionate to public health risks. States rapidly imposed
sweeping restrictions on international traffic, economic activity, and individual rights, with many
state actions taken without adequate public health justification. Virtually every state would turn
to complete, or substantial, bans on entry of international travelers, and while some countries
imposed travel restrictions early as a valid public health measure, others acted arbitrarily or with
discriminatory intent. With rising human rights violations and democratic backsliding, some
heads of state used the crisis as a justification for expanding their powers through autocratic
policies and practices.
Lack of global solidarity and equitable allocation of medical resources. Neglecting IHR
obligations of international assistance and cooperation, states largely reverted to isolationist
policies, geopolitical competition, and global neglect, which served to undermine a coordinated
response, threaten WHO support, and lead to vaccine inequities. Even today, as many highincome nations have achieved high vaccination coverage and are returning to some normalcy,

3

most low- and middle-income states face an extreme scarcity of vaccine doses, medical
treatments, oxygen supplies, and personal protective equipment.7
COVID-19 has highlighted the lack of clarity of state obligations, the failure of political will to
follow public health guidance, and the absence of meaningful accountability for IHR violations,
weakening WHO governance in the pandemic.
WHO Weaknesses
Global health law further shapes WHO’s legal and normative authority to lead the international
response to novel outbreaks. The WHO’s leadership has been tested by the pandemic as never
before. Although global health law depends on strong governance, WHO has been unable to rally
global solidarity throughout the pandemic where it lacks the legal authority and financial
resources to effectively coordinate the public health response.8 Without the ability to
independently verify state reports, inspect conditions on the ground, or to hold states to account,
WHO has at times floundered, drawing on “soft” power to guide the global health response.9
These weaknesses in WHO governance call into question the continuing effectiveness of global
health law and raise an imperative to develop a bold new pandemic treaty. It also makes it
important for the international community to come together in support of WHO, giving it
political support, ample funding, and strong legal powers.
Proposals for a Pandemic Treaty
Overcoming limitations in the COVID-19 response, many proponents of a pandemic treaty have
looked to WHO’s rarely used constitutional authority to develop a binding international
convention, providing a legal foundation for proposals to develop a new treaty through the
World Health Assembly.
Early Proposals
Early proposals for a pandemic treaty arose out of academic analysis. Recognizing gaps in the
scope of the IHR—especially relating to the production of and access to necessary equipment,
medicines, and vaccines—scholars began to argue that a new treaty would strengthen WHO
authority and generate financial resources for a pandemic response.10 Given that the IHR focus
on outbreak detection rather than disease prevention, scholars pushed for a pandemic treaty to
have a “deep prevention” core mandate, providing a vital “one health” perspective (especially
around zoonotic disease) and a focus on upstream determinants of disease outbreaks.11 Beyond
these substantive provisions, scholars and advocates recognized that key cross-cutting legal
principles must serve as a foundation of the treaty, advancing principles of equity, human rights,
and accountability.12 These early contributions would influence formal evaluations of the
pandemic response and recommendations for fundamental reforms.
IPPPR Reports
WHO’s Director-General appointed the Independent Panel on Pandemic Preparedness and
Response (IPPPR) to examine why COVID-19 became a global health crisis and to ensure that
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future infectious diseases outbreaks do not lead to another catastrophic pandemic. In preparing
its report, the IPPPR commissioned a background paper on international law, with this paper
concluding that “a Framework Convention – Protocol approach” to a pandemic treaty could
facilitate governance reforms “in coherence with the broader international legal system,
including under, or separate to, the auspices of the World Health Organization and with, or
without, reforms to existing global health law, such as the International Health Regulations
(2005).”13 Drawing from WHO’s past experience in developing an article 19 convention through
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the final IPPPR report recommended
that states:
Adopt a Pandemic Framework Convention within the next 6 months, using the
powers under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution, and complementary to the
IHR, to be facilitated by WHO and with the clear involvement of the highest
levels of government, scientific experts and civil society.14
The IPPPR also recommended a broader global pandemic architecture, including a
Global Health Threats Council endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly.
Supported by the G20 High Level Independent Panel on Financing the Global Commons
for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, this Council would ensure high level political
leadership and attention to pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, with
authority, financing, and accountability mechanisms to overcome gaps in national and
global capacities.15
World Health Assembly Debates
Delegates during the May 2021 World Health Assembly debated the development of a pandemic
treaty to strengthen national, regional, and global capacities and guide a coordinated international
response to future pandemic threats. Leading up to the World Health Assembly, twenty-five
heads of government and international agencies (including WHO Director-General Tedros
Adhanom Ghebreyesus) joined in an extraordinary call to support a new treaty for pandemic
preparedness and response, signaling high-level political action to protect the world from future
health crises.16 Director-General Tedros remained steadfast in his support for this pandemic
treaty, arguing that such a treaty could promote increased sharing, trust, and accountability,
establishing the basis upon which to build other global health security mechanisms.17
World Health Assembly debates centered around the exact nature of international law that should
be employed—whether a framework convention, regulations, or WHO recommendations—and
whether this legal development should be pioneered under the auspices of WHO.18 Instead of
convening an intergovernmental working group to begin negotiations on the text of a pandemic
treaty, the Assembly resolved to hold a “special session” in November to focus on this singular
issue. Some states had argued that further discussions about developing the treaty should be
delayed until the pandemic is further contained, but others called for a special session to develop
the treaty immediately, suggesting that states start negotiations quickly to be prepare for a
November special session of the World Health Assembly.
Developing a Pandemic Treaty
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These processes and proposals will be crucial as states prepare for World Health Assembly
debates in November, which will consider “the benefits of developing a WHO convention,
agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic preparedness and response with a view
towards the establishment of an intergovernmental process to draft and negotiate such
convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic preparedness and
response.”19
Policymaking Processes
Wide ranging diplomatic efforts will take place through WHO, the United Nations, and other
international forums that will shape the processes for developing a pandemic treaty. In
determining the agenda of the Special Session, the WHO Executive Board will be meeting to
decide the intergovernmental processes to draft and negotiate an international instrument. These
initial debates will examine the exact legal nature of the proposed instrument and how this new
legal authority will relate to the IHR.20 Leading up to the special session in November, a WHO
Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness and Response to Health Emergencies will
be meeting to assess the possibility of a WHO convention or other global agreement. This
Working Group will submit a report to the World Health Assembly, examining the benefits of a
WHO treaty and supporting states as they discuss and negotiate the nature of this guiding
international instrument. The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at
Georgetown University (a WHO Collaborating Center) is partnering with the Foundation of the
National Institutes of Health to support WHO and member states in the pandemic treaty process.
Substantive Authorities
In identifying the specific strategies for preventing, detecting, and responding to future
pandemics, this prospective global health convention provides a unique opportunity to articulate
key state obligations, with strong compliance and accountability mechanisms for:
One Health. Prioritizing prevention through land management, deforestation, and the
effective regulation of wild animal markets and intense human-animal interchange—under a
comprehensive “one health” approach across sectors—the new treaty could reduce the likelihood
of naturally-occurring zoonotic spillovers and other novel threats.21
Biosecurity and Biosafety. The treaty should address biosecurity and biosafety to ensure
that laboratory conditions do not lead to disease outbreaks, creating mechanisms to reduce the
possibility of inadvertent or intentional release of dangerous pathogens through the regulation of
gain-of-function research and laboratory safety protocols.
International Monitoring. In promoting outbreak prevention, detection, and response,
strengthened global institutions must overcome obstacles of national sovereignty in order to
monitor disease threats. International institutions like WHO must have authority to verify state
reports, publish crucial outbreak data without state confirmation, investigate novel pathogens
independently, and institute remedial actions.22
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Advancing Research and Data Transparency. Global governance also must seek to
advance biomedical research to develop therapeutic countermeasures (e.g., diagnostics, vaccines,
and treatments). This requires sharing of pathogen and genomic sequencing data, also with
norms of full transparency and scientific cooperation.
This new pandemic treaty must seek not only to construct strong national authorities that reflect
good public health practice, but moreover must establish a system of good governance to
advance the right to health and human rights principles of equity, transparency and
accountability in the pandemic response:
Good Governance. It is crucial that the new treaty stresses an evidence-based public
health response while proscribing and sanctioning iniquitous government actions, including
“authoritarian power grabs”, continuing monopolies in medical innovations, failure to resource
health systems, heightened levels of pandemic-related hate crimes and violence, and an
institutional neglect of low-income and marginalized communities.23
Right to Health. Following from the WHO Constitution and core international human
rights treaties, the pandemic treaty must be grounded in the human right to health, framing
efforts to maintain core public health capacities; ensure the availability, accessibility, and quality
of health services; provide access to basic needs during lockdowns; and align global health law
with human rights law in framing derogations of human rights to protect public health.24
Human Rights Principles. Looking more broadly to human rights as a foundation of the
pandemic treaty would provide a cross-cutting lens through which to assess rights-based public
health practices, including equity and non-discrimination in the pandemic response, participation
from affected communities, transparency in government decision-making, and accountability for
health outcomes.25
In carrying out the aspirations laid out in developing and implementing a pandemic treaty, it will
be crucial to strengthen global health governance through WHO and other global actors. While
Dr. Tedros has become the world’s moral conscience in the pandemic response, WHO has lacked
the power, funding, and political backing to become the bold leader necessary to meet this
historic moment. This unprecedented public health crisis offers a unique opportunity to reform
WHO authorities and establish a broader global pandemic prevention and response architecture
to coordinate pandemic preparedness on a global scale, partner with other international
organizations in a pandemic response, and ensure international assistance and cooperation
through global health governance:
WHO Authority. In leading the response to pandemic threats, WHO must have a
strengthened mandate for building national health system capacities, coordinating international
collaboration, and influencing state behavior, with states conferring power to WHO to coordinate
international action against pandemic-level threats and establishing mechanisms to facilitate
accountability from non-compliant states.26
Institutional Partnerships. It will be crucial for WHO to work with other institutions of
global health governance (governments, the private sector, civil society, and other international
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organizations) to support the global response, ensuring fair intellectual property systems,
equitable virus sample (and genomic sequencing) sharing, and coordinated research and
development systems; and sustaining partnerships developed in the current pandemic to openly
share intellectual property, technology, and data for countering diseases.27
International Assistance and Cooperation. As a foundation for responding to pandemic
threats, it is imperative that the pandemic treaty recognize the ways in which global inequalities
in access to vaccines, medicines, and diagnostics have prolonged the pandemic, providing WHO
and the wider global pandemic prevention architecture with the authority to work across states to
facilitate the equitable distribution of medical resources and establish an International Pandemic
Financing Facility to support rapid financing in a pandemic response.28 This pandemic has
revealed deep health inequities that must be rectified, including through new institutions to speed
scientific discoveries and make them available globally.
Global Health Security in the Balance
These initiatives will be crucial to developing a pandemic treaty that establishes a legitimate
governing authority that can overcome many of the limitations of the COVID-19 response.
WHO Director-General Tedros has boldly stated that “the world cannot afford to wait until the
pandemic is over to start planning for the next one.”29 If there is one overarching lesson from the
COVID-19 pandemic, it is that the world is safer when we work together than when we devolve
into fierce nationalism and isolated responses. An innovative pandemic treaty could become a
transformative model of global solidarity in the face of common threats, but it will require states
to overcome nationalist forces to meet this global moment, with leaders embracing diplomacy
across nations to prepare for new challenges.
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